



# Interpret Vault Identity Entities and Groups



# Vault Entities



- Vault creates an entity and attaches an alias to it if a corresponding entity doesn't already exist.
  - This is done using the Identity secrets engine, which manages internal identities that are recognized by Vault
- An entity is a representation of a single person or system used to log into Vault. Each has a unique value. Each entity is made up of zero or more aliases
- Alias is a combination of the auth method plus some identification. It is a mapping between an entity and auth method(s)




# Vault Entities





Julie Smith

Finance Specialist




UserPass




# Vault Entities


## Julie Smith


Finance Specialist



Auth Options: UserPass  
LDAP  
GitHub

UserPass: jsmith  
Entity\_ID: b81de864-75fa-5619-1fca-ddd72bbe5b29  
department: accounting  
sub-team: accounts-payable  
accounting 


LDAP: jsmith@example.com  
Entity\_ID: e93d24b2a-b894-0998-43ce-4294cb9ea9b  
department: finance  
team: management  
finance 

GitHub: jsmith22  
Entity\_ID: 4c9ed3482-4894-ced9-a1b2-90344be93aa  
location: us  
sales-region: west  
accounts payable 



# Vault Entities


- An entity can be manually created to map multiple entities for a single user to provide more efficient authorization management
- Any tokens that are created for the entity inherit the capabilities that are granted by alias(es).



# Vault Entities


Entity






Name: Julie Smith  
Entity\_ID: e48de234-58fa-0093-5fde-e5b99abe8b33  
Policy: *management*


Aliases:



GitHub: jsmith22  
Entity\_ID: 4c9ed3482-4894-ced9-a1b2-90344be93aa  
Policy: *finance*




LDAP: jsmith@example.com  
Entity\_ID: e93d24b2a-b894-0998-43ce-4294cb9ea9b  
Policy: *accounting*



UserPass: jsmith  
Entity\_ID: b81de864-75fa-5619-1fca-ddd72bbe5b29

Aliases



# Vault Entities




Name: Julie Smith  
Entity\_ID: e48de234-58fa-0093-5fde-e5b99abe8b33  
Policy: *management* ←

## Aliases:

GitHub: jsmith22  
Entity\_ID: 4c9ed3482-4894-ced9-a1b2-90344be93aa  
Policy: *finance*

LDAP: jsmith@example.com  
Entity\_ID: e93d24b2a-b894-0998-43ce-4294cb9ea9b  
Policy: *accounting* ←



jsmith@example.com



Policies  
accounting  
management


1. Authenticate with LDAP credentials →

← 3. Return a Vault token

2. Validate with LDAP



LDAP



# Create an Entity



TERMINAL

```
$ vault write identity/entity name="Julie Smith" \  
  policies="it-management" \  
  metadata="organization"="HCVOP, Inc" \  
  metadata="team"="management"
```





# Add an Alias to an Entity

TERMINAL


```
# Add GitHub auth as an alias
$ vault write identity/entity-alias name="jsmith22" \
  canonical_id=<entity_id> \
  mount_accessor=<github_auth_accessor>

# Add LDAP auth as an alias
$ vault write identity/entity-alias \
  name="jsmith@hcvop.com" \
  canonical_id=<entity_id> \
  mount_accessor=<ldap_auth_accessor>
```





# Vault Groups

- A group can contain multiple entities as its members.
- A group can also have subgroups.
- Policies can be set on the group and the permissions will be granted to all members of the group.



Name: Finance\_Team  
Policy: *finance*

Members:

	Entity_ID: 4c9ed3482-4894-ced9-a1b2-90344be93aa Policy: accounts_payable
	Entity_ID: e93d24b2a-b894-0998-43ce-4294cb9ea9b Policy: management



# Vault Groups



Name: Finance\_Team

Policy: *finance* ←

Members:



Name: Maria Shi

Entity\_ID: 4c9ed3482-4894-ced9-a1b2-90344be93aa

Policy: *accounts\_payable*

Entity Aliases:

Username: maria.shi

Policy: *base-user*



Name: John Lee

Entity\_ID: e93d24b2a-b894-0998-43ce-4294cb9ea9b

Policy: *management* ←

Entity Aliases:

Username: john.lee

Policy: *super-user* ←



Token inherits **capabilities** granted by alias, entity, and the group

Policies  
super-user  
management  
finance



# Vault Groups

## Internal Group

Groups created in Vault to group entities to propagate identical permissions

Created Manually

## External Group

Groups which Vault infers and creates based on group associations coming from auth methods

Created Manually or Automatically




# Vault Groups

## Internal Groups



- Internal groups can be used to easily manage permissions for entities
- Frequently used when using Vault Namespaces to propagate permissions down to child namespaces
  - Helpful when you don't want to configure an identical auth method on every single namespace




# Vault Groups

## External Groups



- External groups are used to set permissions based on group membership from an external identity provider, such as LDAP, Okta, or OIDC provider.
- Allows you to set up once in Vault and continue manage permissions in the identity provider.
  - Note that the group name must match the group name in your identity provider





**END OF  
SECTION**






# Vault Policies





# How Do We Determine Who Should Access Secrets



# Vault Policies



- Vault policies provide operators a way to permit or deny access to certain paths or actions within Vault (RBAC)
  - Gives us the ability to provide granular control over who gets access to secrets
- Policies are written in declarative statements and can be written using JSON or HCL
- When writing policies, always follow the principal of least privilege
  - In other words, give users/applications only the permissions they need




# Vault Policies



- Policies are Deny by Default (implicit deny) - therefore you must explicitly grant to paths and related capabilities to Vault clients

No policy = no authorization

- Policies support an explicit DENY that takes precedence over any other permission
- Policies are attached to a token. A token can have multiple policies
  - Policies are cumulative and capabilities are additive



# Out of the Box Policies



- **root** policy is created by default – superuser with all permissions
  - You cannot change nor delete this policy
  - Attached to all root tokens
- **default** policy is created by default – provides common permissions
  - You can change this policy, but it cannot be deleted
  - Attached to all non-root tokens by default (can be removed if needed)



# Out of the Box Policies

```
Terminal
$ vault policy list
default
root
```

```
Terminal
$ vault policy read root
No policy named: root
```

```
Terminal
$ vault policy read default
# Allow tokens to look up their own properties
path "auth/token/lookup-self" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}

# Allow tokens to renew themselves
path "auth/token/renew-self" {
  capabilities = ["update"]
}

# Allow tokens to revoke themselves
path "auth/token/revoke-self" {
  capabilities = ["update"]
}

# Allow a token to look up its own capabilities on a path
path "sys/capabilities-self" {
  capabilities = ["update"]
}

.....
```



# Out of the Box Policies



The root policy does not contain any rules but can do anything within Vault. It should be used with extreme care.

```
root policy
path "*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "create", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo"]
}
```



If it *did* have rules, it would probably look something like this....





# Managing Policies Using the CLI



# Managing Policies in Vault

Command Line Interface (CLI)



## Use the `vault policy` command

- `delete`
- `fmt`
- `list`
- `read`
- `write`

Terminal

```
$ vault policy list
admin-policy
default
root
```

Terminal

```
$ vault policy write admin-policy /tmp/admin.hcl
Success! Uploaded policy: admin-policy
```





# Managing Policies in Vault

Command Line Interface (CLI)



```
vault policy write webapp /tmp/webapp.hcl
```

Type of Vault  
object you want  
to work with

Subcommand

Define the name  
of the policy you  
want to create

The location of the file  
containing the pre-written  
policy



# Managing Policies in Vault

Command Line Interface (CLI)



```
TERMINAL

$ vault policy write webapp -<< EOF
path "kv/data/apps/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "create", "update", "delete"]
}
path "kv/metadata/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "create", "update", "list"]
}
EOF
```





# Managing Policies Using the UI



# Managing Policies in Vault

User Interface (UI)



Create a New Policy





# Managing Policies Using the API



# Managing Policies in Vault

HTTP API



## Creating a new Vault policy

- Method: POST

Don't forget you need a valid token

Terminal

```
$ curl \
  --header "X-Vault-Token: hvs.bCEo8HFNIIR8wRGAzWUk" \
  --request PUT \
  --data @payload.json \
  http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/sys/policy/webapp
```

Create  
Vault  
Policy

API Endpoint

Name of the new policy



# Managing Policies in Vault

HTTP API

## Payload File:

```
payload.json
{
  "policy": "path \"kv/apps/webapp\" { capabilities.. \"
}
```





# Anatomy of a Vault Policy





# Anatomy of a Vault Policy



- Remember: Everything in Vault is path based
  - Policies grant or forbid access to those paths and operations

Two key parts to a Vault policy:

```
path "<path>" {  
    capabilities = ["<list of permissions>"]  
}
```



# Anatomy of a Vault Policy



```
path "<path>" {
  capabilities = ["<list of permissions>"]
}
path "<path>" {
  capabilities = ["<list of permissions>"]
}
path "<path>" {
  capabilities = ["<list of permissions>"]
}
```




# Anatomy of a Vault Policy



```
path "kv\data\apps\jenkins" {
  capabilities = ["read", "update", "delete"]
}

path "sys/policies/*" {
  capabilities = ["create", "update", "list", "delete"]
}

path "aws/creds/web-app" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}
```





# Vault Polices - Path



# Vault Policies - Path



- Path: we already know what a path is
  - see Vault Architecture and Pathing Structure in Section 1 for a review
- Examples of paths:
  - `sys/policy/vault-admin`
  - `kv/apps/app01/web`
  - `auth/ldap/group/developers`
  - `database/creds/prod-db`
  - `secrets/data/platform/aws/tools/ansible/app01`
  - `sys/rekey`



# The Details are in the Path



## Path of an Object

secrets/data/platform/aws/tools/ansible

Path where the secrets engine is mounted

Required for a KV v2 secrets engine

Higher-Level Paths  
(data could be stored at each one if needed)

Where the key/value pairs are stored and retrieved



# Vault Policies - Path



- Root-Protected Paths
  - Many paths in Vault require a root token or sudo capability to use
  - These paths focus on important/critical paths for Vault or plugins
- Examples of root-protected paths:
  - `auth/token/create-orphan` (create an orphan token)
  - `pki/root/sign-self-issued` (sign a self-issued certificate)
  - `sys/rotate` (rotate the encryption key)
  - `sys/seal` (manually seal Vault)
  - `sys/step-down` (force the leader to give up active status)



# Vault Policies - Path

- Examples of root-protected paths:
  - `sys/rotate` (rotate the encryption key)
  - `sys/seal` (manually seal Vault)
  - `sys/step-down` (force the leader to give up active status)

```
admin-policy.hcl

path "sys/rotate" {
  capabilities = ["sudo"]
}
path "sys/seal" {
  capabilities = ["sudo"]
}
path "sys/step-down" {
  capabilities = ["sudo"]
}
```







# Vault Polices - Capabilities



# Vault Policies - Capabilities



- Capabilities define what can we do?
  - Capabilities are specified as a list of strings (yes, even if there's just one)

Capability	HTTP Verb
create	POST/PUT
read	GET
update	POST/PUT
delete	DELETE
list	LIST

Capability	Description
sudo	Allows access to paths that are <i>root-protected</i>
deny	Disallows access regardless of any other defined capabilities

create = if the key does not yet exist

update = if the key exists and you want to replace/update it



# Vault Policies - Capabilities



- **Create** – create a new entry
- **Read** – read credentials, configurations, etc
- **Update** – overwrite the existing value of a secret or configuration
- **Delete** – delete something
- **List** – view what's there (doesn't allow you to read)
- **Sudo** – used for root-protected paths
- **Deny** – deny access – always takes precedence over any other capability

**Note:** Write is not a valid capability



# Vault Policy - Example



## Requirement:

- Access to generate database credentials at [database/creds/db01](#)
- Create, Update, Read, and Delete secrets stored at [kv/apps/dev-app01](#)

```
path "database/creds/dev-db01" {  
  capabilities = ["read"]  
}  
path "kv/apps/dev-app01" {  
  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete"]  
}
```

One Policy  
With  
Multiple Rules



# Vault Policy - Example

## Requirements:

- Access to read credentials after the path `kv/apps/webapp`
- Deny access to `kv/apps/webapp/super-secret`

```
path "kv/apps/webapp/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "kv/apps/webapp/super_secret" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}
```

```
Tree
--kv
  |--apps
    |--webapp
      |--super_secret ❌
      |--api_token ✅
      |--host_name ✅
    |--mid-tier
    |--database
  |--cloud
    |--aws
      |--prod
    |--gcp
  |--dev
```





# Pop Quiz

Q: Does this policy permit access to kv/apps/webapp?

A: No, because the policy only permits access to secrets AFTER kv/apps/webapp

```
path "kv/apps/webapp/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "kv/apps/webapp/super_secret" {
  capabilities = ["deny"]
}
```




# Pop Quiz



Q: Does this policy permit you to browse to kv/apps/webapp in the UI?

A: No, because the policy only permits list at the listed path, not the paths leading up to the desired path

```
path "kv/apps/webapp/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}
```





# Customizing the Path





# Using the \* to Customize the Path



- The glob (\*) is a wildcard and can only be used at the end of a path
- Can be used to signify anything "after" a path or as part of a pattern
- Examples:
  - secret/apps/application1/\* - allows any path after application1
  - kv/platform/db-\* - would match kv/platform/db-2 but not kv/platform/db2



# The Details are in the Path



`secret/apps/application1/*`

Path where the secrets engine is mounted

Path created on the secrets engine called `secret`

Apply capabilities on anything AFTER `application1`



# Does it Match?



`secret/apps/application1/*`

Path must start with this – nothing else

Must ALSO include something beyond application1

## Paths that Match

- ✓ `secret/apps/application1/db`
- ✓ `secret/apps/application1/data/production`
- ✓ `secret/apps/application1/web-app`
- ✓ `secret/apps/application1/keys/api_key`

## Paths that Do Not Match

- X `secret/apps/database`
- X `secret/apps/application2`
- X `secret/data/front-end`
- X `kv/secret/app/application`



# Pop Quiz



Given the policy:



```
path "secret/apps/application1/*" {  
  capabilities = ["read"]  
}
```



Can I read from the following path?

`secret/apps/application1`

**Answer:**

No, because the policy only permits read access for anything AFTER application1, not the path `secret/apps/application1` itself



# Pop Quiz



If we wanted to ALSO read from `secret/apps/application1`, the policy would look like this:

```
path "secret/apps/application1/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}

path "secret/apps/application1" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}
```



NEW



# Using the + to Customize the Path



- The plus (+) supports wildcard matching for a single directory in the path
- Can be used in multiple path segments (i.e., secret/+ / + / db)
- Examples:
  - secret/+ / db - matches secret/db2 / db or secret/app / db
  - kv/data/apps/+ / webapp – matches the following:
    - kv/data/apps/dev / webapp
    - kv/data/apps/qa / webapp
    - kv/data/apps/prod / webapp



# The Details are in the Path



secret / data / + / apps / webapp



Path where the secrets engine is mounted



Used for KV V2 Secrets Engine



Can be ANY value



Remaining path



# Does it Match?



secret/data/+/apps/webapp

Path must start with  
this – nothing else

Can be  
ANY value

Path must end with  
this – nothing else

## Paths that Match

- ✓ secret/data/production/apps/webapp
- ✓ secret/data/dev1/apps/webapp
- ✓ secret/data/team-abc/apps/webapp
- ✓ secret/data/456/apps/webapp

## Paths that Do Not Match

- X secret/data/apps/webapp
- X secret/app123/dev
- X secret/data/front-end/apps
- X secret/dev/apps/webapp





# Example Policy



Using multiple + in a policy

```
path "secret/+//webapp" {  
  capabilities = ["read", "list"]  
}
```

```
path "secret/apps/+/team-*" {  
  capabilities = ["create", "read"]  
}
```

Combining the \* and + in a policy



# ACL Templating



- Use variable replacement in some policy strings with values available to the token
- Define policy paths containing double curly braces: `{{<parameter>}}`

Example: Creates a section of the key/value v2 secret engine to a specific user

```
path "secret/data/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["create", "update", "read", "delete"]
}

path "secret/metadata/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["list"]
}
```



# ACL Templating



Parameter	Description
<code>identity.entity.id</code>	The entity's ID
<code>identity.entity.name</code>	The entity's name
<code>identity.entity.metadata.&lt;&lt;metadata key&gt;&gt;</code>	Metadata associated with the entity for the given key
<code>identity.entity.aliases.&lt;&lt;mount accessor&gt;&gt;.id</code>	Entity alias ID for the given mount
<code>identity.entity.aliases.&lt;&lt;mount accessor&gt;&gt;.name</code>	Entity alias name for the given mount
<code>identity.entity.aliases.&lt;&lt;mount accessor&gt;&gt;.metadata.&lt;&lt;metadata key&gt;&gt;</code>	Metadata associated with the alias for the given mount and metadata key
<code>identity.groups.ids.&lt;&lt;group id&gt;&gt;.name</code>	The group name for the given group ID
<code>identity.groups.names.&lt;&lt;group name&gt;&gt;.id</code>	The group ID for the given group name
<code>identity.groups.names.&lt;&lt;group id&gt;&gt;.metadata.&lt;&lt;metadata key&gt;&gt;</code>	Metadata associated with the group for the given key
<code>identity.groups.names.&lt;&lt;group name&gt;&gt;.metadata.&lt;&lt;metadata key&gt;&gt;</code>	Metadata associated with the group for the given key





# Working with Policies



# What Policies are Attached?



Create a new token with "web-app" policy attached:

```
$ vault token create -policy="web-app"

Key          Value
---          -
token        s.7uBlZwXSxOg31uGXIUetEdXD
token_accessor 18r88muoe3x1xEqVqXd1TMwJ
token_duration 768h
token_renewable true
token_policies ["default" "web-app"]
identity_policies []
token_policies [default web-app]
```

Every token gets the **default** policy plus the assigned policy or policies



# Testing Policies



Test to make sure the policy fulfills the requirements

## Example Requirements:

- Clients must be able to request AWS credential granting read access to a S3 bucket
- Read secrets from secret/apikey/Google

TERMINAL

```
$ vault token create -policy="web-app"

# Authenticate with the newly generated token
$ vault login <token>

# Make sure that the token can read
$ vault read secret/apikey/Google

# This should fail
$ vault write secret/apikey/Google key="ABCDE12345"

# Request a new AWS credentials
$ vault read aws/creds/s3-readonly
```

# Administrative Policies



- Permissions for Vault backend functions live at the `sys/` path
- Users/admins will need policies that define what they can do within Vault to administer Vault itself
  - Unsealing
  - Changing policies
  - Adding secret backends
  - Configuring database configurations



# Administrative Policies

Licensing

Setup New Vault Cluster

Configure UI

Rotate Keys

Seal Vault

```
# Configure License
path "sys/license" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list", "create", "update", "delete"]
}
# Initialize Vault
path "sys/init" {
  capabilities = ["read", "update", "create"]
}
# Configure UI in Vault
path "sys/config/ui" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list", "update", "delete", "sudo"]
}
# Allow rekey of unseal keys for Vault
path "sys/rekey/*" {
  capabilities = ["read", "list", "update", "delete"]
}
# Allows rotation of master key
path "sys/rotate" {
  capabilities = ["update", "sudo"]
}
# Allows Vault seal
path "sys/seal" {
  capabilities = ["sudo"]
}
```







**END OF  
SECTION**





# Understand Sentinel Policies



# What is Sentinel?




Sentinel is an embeddable **policy as code** framework to enable *fine-grained, logic-based* policy decisions that can be *extended* to source external information to make decisions.





## Policy as Code

Treat policy like an application — version control, pull review, and automate tests. Use programming constructs to determine policy decisions beyond the limited constraints of typical ACL systems.



## Fine Grained, Conditioned-Based

Treat policy like an application — version control, pull review, and automate tests. Use programming constructs to determine policy decisions beyond the limited constraints of typical ACL systems.



## Embedded

Sentinel is embedded to enable policy enforcement in the data path to actively reject violating behavior instead of passively detecting.



## Enforcement Levels

Advisory, soft-mandatory, and hard-mandatory levels allow policy writers to warn on or reject offending behavior.



## External Information

Sentinel can permit or deny actions based upon external information available to the token, such as time, IP address, requested path, etc.



## Multi-Cloud Compatible

Ensure infrastructure changes are within business and regulatory policy on every infrastructure provider.



# Multi-Platform



## Sentinel is NOT just a Vault feature.

It is available in the Enterprise versions of other HashiCorp Products.



HashiCorp  
**Terraform Enterprise**



HashiCorp  
**Nomad Enterprise**



HashiCorp  
**Vault Enterprise**



HashiCorp  
**Consul Enterprise**



# Types of Sentinel Policies



## Role Governing Policies (RGPs)

- Sentinel policies that are tied to **tokens**, **identity entities**, or **identity groups**
- Access to rich set of controls across various aspects of Vault

## Endpoint Governing Policies (EGPs)

- Sentinel policies that are tied to **paths** instead of tokens
- Access to as much request information as possible
  - Can take an effect even on unauthenticated paths (e.g., login paths)



# Anatomy of a Sentinel Policy



- **Import** – access to reusable libraries to import information or use features
- **Main** – (required) the main rule to be evaluated
- **Rule** – describes a set of conditions resulting in either true or false
- **Variables** – optional, dynamically typed variable

```
import "<library>"
<variable> = <value>
<name> = rule { <condition_to_evaluate> }
main = rule {
    <condition_to_evaluate>
}
```



# Imports



Example of Imports that can be used with Sentinel:

- **base64** – encode & decode Base64 values
- **decimal** – provides functions for operating on numbers as decimals
- **http** – enables the use of HTTP-accessible data outside of the runtime in Sentinel rules
- **json** – parse and access a JSON document
- **runtime** – contains various information about Sentinel runtime
- **sockaddr** – enables working with IP addresses
- **strings** – enables common string operations
- **time** – provides access to execution time and time functions
- **types** – ability to parse an object's type
- **units** – provides access to quick calculations for various byte units
- **version** – used to parse versions and version constraints

These allow fine-grained controls over your Vault environment





# Sentinel Policy Example - RGP



Only allow a specific entity or groups

```
main = rule {  
  identity.entity.name is "jeff" or  
  identity.entity.id is "fe2a5bfd-c483-9263-b0d4-f9d345efdf9f" or  
  "sysops" in identity.groups.names or  
  "14c0940a-5c07-4b97-81ec-0d423accb8e0" in keys(identity.groups.by-id)  
}
```

If the user "Jeff" is deleted and recreated, the match will fail because we're also enforcing the entity ID



# Sentinel Policy Example - EGP



Disallow all previously-generated tokens based on date:

- You could apply this EGP to the "\*" endpoint

```
import "time"

main = rule when not request.unauthenticated {
  time.load(token.creation_time).unix >
    time.load("2022-12-25T00:00:01Z").unix
}
```

Could be used as a "break-glass" scenario where previous tokens were compromised



# Sentinel Policy Example - EGP



```
import "sockaddr"  
import "mfa"  
import "strings"  
  
# We expect logins to come only from a specific private IP range  
cidrcheck = rule {  
  sockaddr.is_contained(request.connection.remote_addr, "10.0.23.0/16")  
}
```

*# Require Ping MFA validation to succeed*

```
ping_valid = rule {  
  mfa.methods.ping.valid  
}
```

```
main = rule when request.path is "auth/ldap/login" {  
  ping_valid and cidrcheck  
}
```

Sets the scope of policy

Must also pass both rules



# Enforcement Levels



Sentinel offers three different enforcement levels that can be set per Sentinel policy:

Enforcement Level	Description
Advisory	The policy is allowed to fail
Soft Mandatory	The policy must pass unless an override is specified
Hard Mandatory	The policy must pass no matter what

To override a Sentinel policy (soft mandatory), use the `-policy-override` flag when executing the Vault command



# Deploy Sentinel Policies via UI



A screenshot of the Vault web interface. The browser address bar shows "vault.hcvop.com:8200/ui/vault/rgp". The navigation menu includes "Secrets", "Access", "Policies", and "Tools". The "Policies" section is expanded, showing "ACL Policies", "Role Governing Policies", and "Endpoint Governing Policies". A yellow arrow points to the "Policies" menu item. Two green arrows point to "Role Governing Policies", and two blue arrows point to "Endpoint Governing Policies". The main content area is titled "RGP Policies" with a "Sentinel" tab. It contains a "Create RGP policy +" button and a message: "No RGP policies yet. A list of policies will be listed here. Create your first RGP policy to get started." Below the message are links for "Create RGP policy" and "Learn more".



# Deploy RGP Sentinel Policy via UI



The screenshot shows the Vault web interface for creating a Role Governing Policy (RGP). The browser address bar shows `vault.hcvop.com:8200/ui/vault/policies/rgp/create`. The navigation menu includes "Secrets", "Access", "Policies", and "Tools". The left sidebar shows "POLICIES" with sub-items: "ACL Policies", "Role Governing Policies" (selected), and "Endpoint Governing Policies".

The main content area is titled "Create RGP policy" and includes the following fields:

- Name:** A text input field containing "business-hours-access", highlighted with a yellow arrow.
- Policy:** A code editor containing the following HCL code:

```
1
2
3 import "time"
4
5 # Expect requests to only happen during work days (Monday through Friday)
6 # 0 for Sunday and 6 for Saturday
7 workdays = rule {
8     time.now.weekday > 0 and time.now.weekday < 6
9 }
10
11 # Expect requests to only happen during work hours (7:00 am - 6:00 pm)
12 workhours = rule {
13     time.now.hour > 7 and time.now.hour < 18
14 }
15
```

An "Upload file" toggle is visible to the right of the code editor.
- Enforcement level:** A dropdown menu set to "hard-mandatory", highlighted with a blue arrow.

At the bottom, there are two buttons: "Create policy" (in blue) and "Cancel". A small note below the code editor states: "You can use Alt+Tab (Option+Tab on MacOS) in the code editor to skip to the next field".



# Deploy EGP Sentinel Policy via UI



The screenshot shows the Vault web interface for creating a new Endpoint Governing Policy (EGP). The browser address bar shows the URL `vault.hcvop.com:8200/ui/vault/policies/egp/create`. The navigation menu includes "Secrets", "Access", "Policies", and "Tools". The left sidebar shows "POLICIES" with sub-items: "ACL Policies", "Role Governing Policies", and "Endpoint Governing Policies".

The main content area is titled "Create EGP policy" and contains the following fields:

- Name:** A text input field containing "cidr-validation-jenkins", highlighted with a green arrow.
- Policy:** A code editor with a dark background and light text. The code is:


```
1 import "sockaddr"  
2 import "strings"  
3  
4 # Expect requests to come only from our Jenkins server  
5 cidrcheck = rule {  
6   sockaddr.is_contained(request.connection.remote_addr, "10.0.16.88/32")  
7 }  
8  
9 main = rule {  
10   cidrcheck  
11 }
```

 An "Upload file" toggle is visible to the right of the code editor.  
Below the code editor, a note states: "You can use Alt+Tab (Option+Tab on MacOS) in the code editor to skip to the next field".
- Enforcement level:** A dropdown menu with "hard-mandatory" selected, highlighted with a blue arrow.
- Paths:** A text input field containing "kv/automation/jenkins", highlighted with a red arrow, and an "Add" button to its right.

At the bottom of the form are two buttons: "Create policy" (in blue) and "Cancel".



# Policy Evaluation







**END OF  
SECTION**





# Define Control Groups and Describe their Basic Workflow



# Control Groups



- Control groups add an **additional authorization** requirement on configured paths
- When a control group is created, the following will occur:
  1. The client makes a request to a path as normal
  2. Vault returns a wrapping token – rather than the requested secrets
  3. The authorizers defined in the control group policy must approve the request
  4. Once all authorizations are satisfied, the client can unwrap the secrets



# Control Group Factors



- Control Group requirements can be specified in either **ACL policies** or within a **Sentinel policy**
- Currently, the only supported Control Group **factor** is an Identity Group
  - An authorizer must belong to a specific identity group
  - The policy will define the group, or groups, who are approvers for the requested path



# Control Group Workflow



Here's my accessor. Please approve.

cqL9n3r4kMeIQZekoLrMWMWN



1. GET kv/data/customers/orders

2. Response

```
"wrap_info": {  
  "token": "hvs.CAESIPvNkRgluUVNT_ccLsm6aZ-",  
  "accessor": "cqL9n3r4kMeIQZekoLrMWMWN",  
  "ttl": 300,  
  ...  
}
```

3. Share Accessor with Managers for Approval



Policy with Group Control on kv/data/customers/orders



# Control Group Workflow




Note: If the authorization can not be satisfied, the token is revoked



5. `vault unwrap hvs.CAESIPvNkRg..`

6. Response

```
"data": {  
  "order": "5830375749202",  
  "customer": "HCVOP9943250D2",  
  "data": "25-12-2002",  
  "creditcard": "1234-5678-0987-6553",  
  ...  
}
```



Policy with Group Control on  
kv/data/customers/orders

4. Authorize

4. Authorize



# Control Groups in Vault Policies



```
path "kv/data/customers/orders" {  
  capabilities = ["read"]  
  control_group = {  
    factor "acct_manager" {  
      identity {  
        group_names = ["account-managers"]  
        approvals = 2  
      }  
    }  
  }  
}
```

← Regular ACL Policy

← Control Group

We need two account managers to approve this request



# Control Groups in Sentinel Policies (EGP)



Deploy this EGP against  
kv/data/customers/orders

```
import "controlgroup"

control_group = func() {
  numAuthzs = 0
  for controlgroup.authorizations as authz {
    if "account-managers" in authz.groups.by_name {
      numAuthzs = numAuthzs + 1
    }
  }
  if numAuthzs >= 2 {
    return true
  }
  return false
}

main = rule {
  control_group()
}
```

We need two account managers to approve this request





# Control Groups in Action (CLI)



```

$ vault login hvs.CAESIA7Y-LwSxnE926onQwdxIUf7w7KJ5-
Success! You are now authenticated. The token information displayed below
is already stored in the token helper. You do NOT need to run "vault login"
again. Future Vault requests will automatically use this token.

Key          Value
---          -
token        hvs.CAESIA7Y-LwSxnE926onQwdxIUf7w7KJ5-
token_accessor  72N0rIUJDduMy4LWiTbUhh8n6
token_duration  767h59m51s
token_renewable true
token_policies ["ctl-grp-cust-data" "default"]
identity_policies []
policies      ["ctl-grp-cust-data" "default"]

bk~$ vault kv get kv/customers/orders
Key          Value
---          -
wrapping_token:  hvs.H5IATHFed2Aqk5RSvW1eEF4d
wrapping_accessor: vGIHUUfodJLCUho87VZjsCb4
wrapping_token_ttl: 24h
wrapping_token_creation_time: 2022-12-25 10:00:31 -0400 EDT
wrapping_token_creation_path: kv/data/customers/orders

```

I authenticated with a token tied to a policy with a Control Group

Requested data from KV store

Got wrapping token and accessor instead of data




# Authorizer Actions (Account Manager)



The image shows a sequence of three overlapping screenshots of the Vault Account Manager interface, illustrating the process of authorizing a user. The interface has a dark header with "Secrets", "Access", and "Tools" tabs, and a "Status" indicator. The left sidebar contains "Leases" and "Control Groups".

- The first screenshot shows the "Control Groups" page with a red box highlighting the "Authorize" button.
- The second screenshot shows the "Authorize" modal dialog with a lock icon, the name "Bob Smith", and an "Approve" button.
- The third screenshot shows the "Control Groups" page with a green success message: "Thanks! You have given authorization". Below the message, it states: "Bob Smith is authorized to access kv/data/customers/orders" and "Already approved by Ellen Wright". A "Back" button is visible at the bottom.



# Not yet Authorized



**TOOLS**

- Wrap
- Lookup
- Unwrap**
- Rewrap
- Random
- Hash

## Unwrap data

**Error**  
Request needs further authorization


**Wrapping token**

hvs.H5IATHFed2Aqk5RSvW1eEF4d


**Unwrap data**



# Unwrap the Secrets After Approvals



A screenshot of the Vault web interface. The top navigation bar includes "Secrets", "Access", "Policies", and "Tools". The "Tools" menu item is highlighted with a red box. On the left, a sidebar lists various tool options: Wrap, Lookup, Unwrap, Rewrap, Random, and Hash. The main content area shows the "Unwrap data" page with a "Wrapping token" field containing "hvs.CAESICgyw13" and an "Unwrap data" button.



A screenshot of the Vault web interface showing the "Unwrap data" page. The page has two tabs: "Data" and "Wrap Details". The "Data" tab is active, displaying the "Unwrapped Data" in a code block. Below the code block are "Copy" and "Back" buttons.

```
{
  "data": {
    "customer_id": "3dj204d2",
    "order_data": "25-12-2022",
    "order_number": "582984729"
  },
  "metadata": {
    "created_time": "2022-06-24T13:52:43.946922Z",
    "custom_metadata": null,
    "deletion_time": "",
    "destroyed": false,
    "version": 1
  }
}
```





# Describe and Interpret Multi-Tenancy with Namespaces



# What are Namespaces?

- Allows organizations to provide “Vault as a Service”
  - Provides isolated environments on single Vault environment
  - Multi-tenant but centralized management
  - Allows delegation of Vault of responsibilities
- Available in all versions of Vault Enterprise
- Each namespace can have its own:
  - Policies
  - Auth Methods
  - Secrets Engines
  - Tokens
  - Identities




# What are Namespaces?



- The default namespace is 'root'
- Namespaces are created in a hierarchical fashion
- Just like root, paths and ACLs are relative to the namespace, making easier to re-use commands and policies across multiple namespaces
- Tokens are only valid in a single namespace, but you can create an entity who has access to other namespaces







# Namespaces






# Assigning Namespaces

Production Vault Cluster



Cloud Engineers




DevOps Engineers



Core Developers



# Administrative Delegation




Developer  
Namespace  
Admin



Responsible for Dev:

- Secrets Engines
- Policies
- Auth Methods

Vault  
Engineers




Responsible for:

- Cluster Nodes
- Audit Devices
- Root Namespace
- Storage Backend
- Vault Upgrades



# Authenticating to Namespaces



# Common Namespace Commands



## Create Namespace

```
$ vault namespace create <namespace>
```

## List Namespaces

```
$ vault namespace list
```

## Delete a Namespace

```
$ vault namespace delete <namespace>
```



# Using Namespaces on the CLI



Set Namespace Environment Variable – then run commands as normal

```
$ export VAULT_NAMESPACE=<namespace>
```

Reference a Namespace on the CLI when running a command

```
$ vault kv get -namespace=<namespace> kv/data/sql/prod
```



# Referencing Namespaces in the API



**Add the API Header = X-Vault-Namespace**

```
curl \  
  -header "X-Vault-Token: "hvs.a83b50ed2aa548212" \  
  -header "X-Vault-Namespace: "development/" \  
  -request GET \  
  https://vault.hcvop.com:8200/v1/kv/data/sql/prod
```



# Referencing Namespaces in the API



## Add the Namespace to the API Endpoint

```
curl \  
  -header "X-Vault-Token: "hvs.CAESIA7Y-LwSxnE926onQwdxIUF7" \  
  -request GET \  
  https://vault.hcvop.com:8200/v1/development/kv/data/sql/prod
```



# Writing Policies for Namespaces


The path is relative to the Namespace

Root Namespace

Cloud-Team Namespace



database/



```
path = "database/creds/prod-db" {  
  capabilities = ["read"]  
}
```



```
path = "cloud-team/database/creds/prod-db" {  
  capabilities = ["read"]  
}
```





# Authenticating to a Namespace via UI



**Sign in to Vault**

Namespace

**Method**

**Username**

**Password**

[More options](#)

Contact your administrator for login credentials



# Authenticating to a Namespace via CLI



```
$ vault login -namespace=cloud-team -method=userpass username=bryan  
Password (will be hidden):
```

Success! You are now authenticated. The token information displayed below is already stored in the token helper. You do NOT need to run "vault login" again. Future Vault requests will automatically use this token.

Key	Value
---	-----
token	hvs.CAESIM5RikdMODs5nZrFrsecgqUKggrnXgSOZrkvXMtUXnwKGicKImh2cy5oOXlrNWFQRHNQM1Y4M G5xZkF0VFB6dVcubjU3eTYQwAM
token_accessor	rOH7HYtHmZ6fDX4z0RCJVxbF.n57y6
token_duration	768h
token_renewable	true
token_policies	["default"]
identity_policies	[]
policies	["default"]
token_meta_username	bryan



# Enabling an Auth Method In a Namespace





```
$ vault namespace create cloud-team
Key      Value
---      -
id       n57y6
path     cloud-team/

# Enable userpass auth method using the namespace flag
$ vault auth enable -namespace=cloud-team userpass
Success! Enabled userpass auth method at: userpass


# Enable aws auth method using environment variable
$ export VAULT_NAMESPACE=cloud-team
$ vault auth enable aws
```





# Working with Namespaces in the UI




# Administrative Delegation



# Control Group Workflow



# Assigning Namespaces



# Oh No...Our Cluster...It's Broken

